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This article separates oligopoly-power and cost-efficiency effects of changes in industrial concentration and 
assesses their impact on output prices in 32 food-processing industries.  Empirical results indicate that although 
concentration induces cost efficiency in one-third of the industries, oligopoly-power effects either dominate cost 
efficiency or reinforce inefficiency, resulting in higher output prices in most industries.  The article also provides 
fresh econometric estimates of oligopoly power and economies of size for the industries in question. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In his review of the new empirical industrial 
organization (NEIO) literature, Bresnahan (1989) 
concludes that although NEIO models are useful in 
measuring market power, they are not as useful in 
guiding policy when market structure rather than 
conduct is the policy target. First, he argues that the 
narrow focus of NEIO studies on single and often 
heavily concentrated industries is too limited to be useful 
in mapping structure into conduct and performance. 
Cross-industry studies, on the other h and, provide 
information over a wider range of industries and, despite 
their well-known problems, continue to influence policy 
(Salinger, 1990).  Second, Bresnahan also argues that 
since market power is imputed rather than observed in 
NEIO models, its relationship to observable structural 
and behavioral variables in often unclear to policy 
makers. Thus, to make NEIO findings more policy-
relevant, studies should consider a wider range of 
industries and incorporate observable structural 
measures of interest to policy makers, such as industrial 
concentration. 
This article develops an NEIO model that formally 
incorporates measures of industrial concentration and 
separates out the oligopoly-power from the cost-
efficiency effects of concentration on output prices.
1 The 
model is the oligopoly analogue of Azzam's (1997) 
oligopsony model, which extends Appelbaum's (1982) 
model to formally include industrial concentration. The 
separation of the two effects is not only of academic 
interest but is also of public policy concern because the 
basic problem facing antitrust authorities is that of a 
tradeoff between efficiency and market power 
(Williamson, 1968; Perry, 1984; Bian and McFetridge, 
2000).  That is, whether or not concentration is in the 
public interest depends critically on whether or not the 
cost-efficiency gains through concentration offset the 
welfare losses from greater market power.    
The model is applied to 4-digit SIC data on 32 U.S. 
manufacturing industries over the 1972-92 period. The 
econometric results provide fresh estimates of oligopoly 
                                                 
1 A large number of studies have tested the relationship 
between efficiency proxies and price-cost margins (e.g., 
Demsetz, 1973; Martin, 1988; Rosenbaum, 1994) while others 
have tested more explicitly the relationship between costs and 
concentration (Peltzman, 1977; Dickson, 1994) or the ad hoc 
relationship between price and market structure (e.g., Cotterill, 
1986). A few recent studies have separated oligopsony power 
from cost efficiency using structural models (Azzam, 1997; 
Azzam and Schroeter, 1995) but studies of this type focusing 
on oligopoly power are lacking. 
power and economies of size in these industries and 
reveal that Cournot behavior is widespread. The 
empirical findings also indicate that although cost-
efficiency effects from concentration are important in 
one-third of the industries, in nearly every case the 
oligopoly-power effects dominate or reinforce cost 
inefficiencies, resulting in higher output prices. The few 
exceptions where concentration is beneficial to buyers 
are in the fat-and-oil sector, which is characterized by 
strong economies of size and product homogeneity. 
Finally, this analysis shows that NEIO models that 
bridge the gap between conduct and market structure can 
be useful for policy making decisions, especially those 
targeting industries based on efficiency vs. the 
consumer's interest. 
 
2.  The Model 
 
The starting point is an industry of  N firms 
producing a homogeneous good Q requiring factors  r x  
for  k r , , 1K = and facing a derived market demand 
curve 
 
    ) , ( z p f Q = ,   (1) 
   
where  p is output price and  z is a vector of demand 
shifters.  Profit maximization by the j
th firm yields the 
supply relation  
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is the j
th firm's conjectural variation,  Cj(.) is the cost 
function, w  is a vector of factor prices, and t  is the state 
of technology.  By Shephard's Lemma, the derived 
demand for the 
th r factor by the j
th firm is given by 
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Following Olson and Shieh (1989), and Baffes and 
Vasavada (1989), the cost function is assumed to take 
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equations (2) and (3) by  j s , using (4), and summing 
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where      
   
2
j j s H ￿ =  
 
is the Herfindahl index,  F is the industry (weighted) 
conjectural variation and  
 
    rj
j
r x X ￿ =   
 
is total industry employment of the r
th factor.  By virtue 
of the expression for the semi-elasticity of demand, the 
demand function (1) takes the semi-logarithmic form 
 
    i i
i
z p Q d h d ￿ + + = 0 ln ,  (7) 
where h, d0 and di are parameters. The first term on the 
right-hand side of the supply relation in (5) is the mark-
up over marginal cost.  Its magnitude depends on the 
level of concentration (H), the semi-elasticity of demand 
(h), and the type of market conduct (F).  If conduct is 
competitive, then  1 - = F  and the markup is zero.  For 
Cournot,  0 = F  and the markup is  h / H - .  For 
conduct that is less competitive than Cournot, 
1 ) / 1 ( 0 - £ F < H  and the upper bound on the markup 
is  h / 1 - .  However, for noncompetitive conduct, 
concentration affects both the markup and marginal cost. 
Note that the commonly-used conjectural variation 
elasticity (Appelbaum, 1982) can be defined as 
H ) 1 (
* F + = F which ranges between 0 and 1, the price 
elasticity of demand is given by  P h h = * , and the 
industry oligopoly power is defined by  * / * h F - = L . 
Following Azzam (1997), F is treated as constant.
2 
Thus, differentiating (5) with respect to  H  yields the 
decomposed effects of concentration on output price: 
 










- =   (8) 
 
where the first term on the right-hand side is the 
oligopoly-power effect and the second is the cost-
efficiency effect (or the effect of a rise in concentration 
on marginal cost).   
A measure for the cost elasticity with respect to 









=   (9) 
where      
 
  i i i j i ij i j w t w w g a ￿ ￿￿ + = A
2 / 1 2 / 1  
 
and      
    i i i w B b ￿ = .  
 
Note that ecy depicts economies of size and is the inverse 
of the degree of returns to scale.  If B=0, constant returns 
exist, and the only effect of rising concentration on price 
is through oligopoly power.  If B>0, diseconomies of 
scale exist, and a rise in concentration raises prices 
through a rise in both oligopoly power and costs.  When 
                                                 
2 Following the work of Stigler (1964) and Stalhammar 
(1991), two additional specifications of F were tested.  One 
was to let  H ln 1 0 q q + = F  in order to allow industry 
conduct to vary with concentration.  Another test was the 
inclusion of imports and exports. A lthough these extensions 
provided some interesting insights in some cases, they 
deteriorated the results of interest.  Given the focus and scope 
of this article, F was therefore treated as a constant. Market Power and/or Efficiency     Lopez, Azzam, and Lirón-España 
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economies of scale are present (B<0), the effect of a rise 
in concentration on price can be positive, negative, or 
zero, depending on whether the oligopoly-power effect 




3.  Empirical Procedures 
 
The model is operationalized with data at the 4-digit 
SIC (1987 definitions) level for the 1972-92 period. The 
econometric model is based on equations (5), (6), and 
(7) depicting pricing behavior, input demand equations, 
and the output demand equation. Although (5) is the 
main equation of interest, the input and output demand 
equations impose stronger theoretical restrictions and 
assist in identifying the corresponding parameters in the 
pricing equations.  The model assumes three variable 
inputs: materials (XK), labor (XL), and capital (XK).
4 Thus, 
the estimating model consists of five equations: the 
pricing equation, three input demand equations, and the 
output demand equation.  The latter is assumed to be a 
function of output price ( P), income ( y) and a trend 
variable (t), where price and income are deflated by the 
consumer price index (d).  
The endogenous variables are Q, P, XK, XL, and XK. 
The exogenous variables are WK, WL, WK , y, t (=1 for 
1972 through 21 for 1992), d, and H. The parameters to 
be estimated are  , ,h F  the  ij a 's, the  j b 's, the  i g 's,  0 d , 
and the d0 and di's.
5  
                                                 
3 Note that these effects of concentration are for a constant 
level of output and that higher concentration leads to lower, 
higher, or no change in costs if there are increasing, 
decreasing, or constant returns to scale, respectively. By fixing 
output, a rise in the Herfindahl index implies a change in the 
distribution in output across firms, with more output being 
produced by the larger firms leading to lower industry cost in 
the presence of economies of scale. Note that the econometric 
model measures economies of scale on a market share-
weighted industry cost function and that technical change (t) is 
assumed to affect the industry marginal cost intercept, not the 
slope. 
4 See Bartelsman and Gray (1996) for precise definitions of 
these variables. Following the U.S. Department of Labor 
(1997), capital services are assumed to be proportional to 
capital stocks. The derivation of the price of capital is 
discussed below. The material inputs include raw materials 
(agricultural, packaging, and certain services) as well as 
energy. The latter accounted for less than 2% of variable costs 
in all cases. 
5 The structural model contained 17 coefficients, which we 
estimated with 21 observations. Since the sample is small and 
the standard errors for nonlinear models are only 
approximately correct for small  samples, the statistical 
  The main data source for prices and quantities of 
outputs and inputs was the online National Bureau of 
Economic Research database of Bartelsman, Becker and 
Gray (2000) on U.S. manufacturing industries. 
  Following the U.S. Department of Labor (1997, p. 
107), we define the rental price of capital in dollars per 
unit of real capital stock. Due to lack of data on the price 
of capital at the 4 -digit SIC level, all industries are 
assumed to face the same rental prices but each to have 
different levels of capital stock. Therefore, the rental 
price of capital was computed by dividing the cost of 
capital services (provided electronically by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics) divided by total capital assets at the 2-
digit SIC level. Due to data limitations, we use an 
instrumental variable for H for the years when it was not 
available (see Appendix for details).  
Given the  endogeneity of output quantity and the 
price of output, the system of five equations is estimated 
with non-linear 3SLS using the SHAZAM 7.0 software. 
The results for 32 food industries are presented below.  
 
4.  Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Conduct, Demand, and Economies of Size 
Table 1 presents selected estimated parameters: 
h , F , L and  cy e .  The null hypothesis for conduct is 
1 - = F  (competitive behavior) and for the elasticity of 
cost with respect to output  1 = cy e  (constant returns to 
scale). An alternative conduct hypothesis tested is 
Cournot behavior  ) 0 ( = F , given its common use in 
empirical analysis. As usual, one, two and three asterisks 
next to the estimated coefficients indicate significance at 
the one, five and 10 percent levels, respectively. Note 
that the indicated statistical significance for F  an  cy e in 
Table 1 are relative to  –1 and 1 (rather than the usual 
null hypothesis of 0), respectively. 
The results in Table 1 indicate that the estimated  Fs 
ranged from  –0.996 for SIC 2062 (very close to the 
lower limit of –1) to 6.515 for SIC 2097 (well below its 
maximum limit of 63 given by 1
1 -
- H ).   Twenty of 32 
industries (63%) had non-competitive industry conduct 
at the 5 percent level.  It should be noted that the 
estimated  Fs for 20 of the industries also rejected the 
null hypothesis of Cournot behavior  ) 0 ( = F  at the 5% 
level. The derived conjectural variation elasticities 
ranged from 0.00068 for SIC 2062 to 0.2445 for 2075. 
The estimated oligopoly Lerner indexes (evaluated at 
                                                                                     
significance of the coefficients should be interpreted with 
caution. Market Power and/or Efficiency     Lopez, Azzam, and Lirón-España 
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mean values of P) ranged from 0.035 in SIC 2075 to 
0.815 in SIC 2035. Twenty-seven of the 32 industries 
(84%) have mark-ups statistically different from perfect 
competition at the 5% level. 
The number of industries with non-competitive 
mark-ups is much larger than those indicating non-
collusive conduct from only estimated F s. As shown by 
Nevo (2000) in the breakfast cereal industry, it is 
possible to have non-collusive behavior and yet have a 
strong degree of oligopoly power and level of mark-up. 
As a case in point, the soybean oil industry (SIC 2075) 
was the  most collusive, based on the conjectural 
variation elasticities; however, this industry had the 
lowest mark-up as indicated by the Lerner index, 
suggesting that in some cases concentration is a way to 
survive when industries are operating on small margins.  
Nonetheless, the results are consistent with a myriad of 
studies that have found that most food processing 
industries are non-competitive.
6 
In terms of economies of size (calculated at mean 
values of data), the results reveal that approximately 12 
industries (38%) have significant economies of size, 9 
(28%) have significant diseconomies of size, and the 
remaining 11 (34%) did not reject the constant returns to 
size hypothesis at the 5% level. The economies of size 
parameters, which are critical for the evaluation of cost 




4.2 Estimated Market Power and Efficiency Effects 
Table 2 presents the results based on equation (8) for 
the separate effects of changes in the Herfindahl index 
on oligopoly-power, cost efficiency, and output price. 
These effects were calculated and tested at mean values 
of the data.  
In terms of oligopoly power, at the 10% level, the 
results indicate that 26 of the 32 industries (81%) 
significantly increase oligopoly-power as concentration 
increases. For the remaining six industries, increases in 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Bhuyan and Lopez (1997). In particular, 
the estimated Lerner index for the meatpacking industry 
(average=0.099) is between the ones estimated by Schroeter 
(1988) for beef (0.04) and by Schroeter and Azzam (1990) for 
beef and pork (0.14).
  Likewise, the mark-ups estimated by 
Morrison-Paul (2001) correspond to Lerner indexes between 
0.05 and 0.20 between 1971 and 1991. 
7 The average estimate of Morrison-Paul (2001) for long run 
economies of size in meatpacking is 0.965 (cf. 0.95 in Table 
1). The average degree of economies of size in Table 1 is 
0.997, which is nearly CRS, somewhat above the 0.834 
estimated by Bhuyan and Lopez (1997). 
concentration do not result in significant increases in 
oligopoly power.
8  
In terms of cost effects, the results indicate that 11 
industries (34%) show significant gains (at the 10% 
level) in cost efficiency with concentration, while eight 
show a positive and significant increase in cost as 
concentration rises.  The remaining 13 industries do not 
show a significant impact of concentration on cost 
efficiency.
9 The q uestion then remains how much of 
these potential cost savings is being passed on and how 
much is being pocketed by the industries. 
Combining oligopoly power and cost effects, 
concentration results in significant decreases in output 
prices in only three industries (9.4%), with 22 industries 
(68.7%) showing a net and significant increase in price 
as concentration rises, while seven (21.9%) show 
insignificant output price effects at the 10% level.  The 
notable cases where concentration has a benign effect on 
prices are in the fat and oil industries: 2074, 2076 and 
2077.  
A number of industries show a strong trade-off 
between oligopoly-power and efficiency effects, where 
both effects are statistically significant and their 
magnitudes considerable.  In this category fall SICs 
2011 (meatpacking), 2022 (cheese), 2026 (fluid milk), 
2044 (rice milling), 2074 (soybean oil), 2076 (vegetable 
oil), 2077 (animal fats and oil), 2097 (manufactured ice), 
2098 (macaroni and spaghetti), and food preparations 
(2099).  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The purpose of this article is two-fold. First, it 
provides a theory-based empirical model that separates 
the oligopoly-power and cost-efficiency effects of 
industrial concentration on output prices. The 
econometric model adapts the oligopsony model of 
Azzam (1997) to the oligopoly-power case. A second 
contribution is that by applying the model to time-series 
data across U.S. food processing industries, information 
                                                 
8 The impacts a re particularly large and significant for 
sausages and prepared meats (2013), poultry and egg 
processing (2015), fluid milk (2026), candy and confectionary 
(2064), prepared feeds (2048), animal and marine fats and oils 
(2077), canned fruits and vegetables (2033), manufactured ice 
(2097), macaroni and spaghetti (2098), and food preparations 
(2099). 
9 In descending order, the cost efficiency effects that are 
statistically significant at the 10% level are particularly 
pronounced in the following industries: animal and marine fats 
(2077), fluid milk (2026), cottonseed oil (2074), manufactured 
ice (2097), food preparations (2099), rice milling (2044), 
vegetable oil (2076), and meat packing (2011). Market Power and/or Efficiency     Lopez, Azzam, and Lirón-España 
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is provided on the potential impact of further 
concentration on oligopoly power and cost efficiency 
within each industry and across industries, which can be 
useful to policy makers concerned with market structure.   
From the empirical results, we see some systematic 
patterns of the impact of industrial concentration in the 
U.S. food industries. Specifically, we find that further 
increases in concentration would: (1) significantly 
increase oligopoly power; (2) result in cost efficiency in 
one-third of the industries; and (3) increase output price 
in nearly every case. These patterns r aise some 
interesting questions. What is and what determines, for 
example, the critical level of concentration beyond 
which concentration induces net inefficiency?  
There are other issues that we do not address here 
but that are worthy of further attention. Among these are 
the role of foreign trade and possible simultaneous 
oligopsony effects on factor prices in certain markets. In 
spite of the pattern of concentration, there are strong 
differences among industries. It is timely and relevant to 
examine the  sources and consequences of these 
differences more fully. Extending the analysis to 
incorporate any of these issues or applying it to other 
industries will provide further insights into the market 
power and cost-efficiency effects of changes in 
concentration. Finally, this article shows that NEIO 
analyses can be made more policy-relevant if they cover 
market structure and a wider range of industries, as 
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Table 1: Selected Parameter Estimates, U.S. Food Processing Industries, 1972-92.   
 
SIC  Industry  F   s.e.  h  s.e.  L  s.e.  cy e   s.e. 
 




***  0.013 
2013  Saus. & Prep. Meats  0.726  0.808  -0.243
**  0.112  0.144
***  0.017  0.998  0.015 
2015  Poultry & Egg Proc.  -0.482  0.329  -0.135  0.083  0.106
***  0.017  0.489  0.011 
2022  Cheese  -0.865  0.129  -0.095  0.090  0.094
***  0.015  1.011  0.011 
2023  Dry/Cond.& Ev.Milk  0.099  0.412  -0.387
***  0.173  0.197
***  0.059  1.037  0.039 
2024  Ice Cream & Fr. Desserts  -0.872  0.634  -0.049  0.241  0.097
***  0.023  1.063
**  0.026 
2026  Fluid Milk  3.154
**  1.528  -0.444
***  0.157  0.200
***  0.017  0.916  0.019 
2032  Canned Specialties  -0.785
***  0.073  -0.404
***  0.101  0.125
***  0.026  1.214
***  0.032 
2033  Canned Fruit & Veg.  -0.397  0.509  -0.168  0.139  0.118
**  0.020  1.104
***  0.023 
2034  Dried Fruit & Veg.  -0.871
***  0.196  -0.114  0.171  0.086
***  0.023  1.195
***  0.029 
2035  Pickles, Sauces, etc.  0.063  0.687  -0.433  0.270  0.815
***  0.046  0.884
***  0.022 
2043  Cereal Breakfast Foods  -0.863
***  0.037  -0.259
***  0.052  0.182
**  0.033  1.553
***  0.060 
2044  Rice Milling  -0.495
***  0.145  -0.191
***  0.031  0.252  0.056  0.256
**  0.062 
2045   Prep. Flour & Doughs  -0.829
***  0.153  -0.314
*  0.188  0.063  0.041  1.310
***  0.062 
2046   Wet Corn Milling  -0.918
***  0.039  -0.196
***  0.045  0.090
**  0.037  1.055  0.036 
2048  Prep. Feeds  -0.422
*  0.227  -0.096
***  0.035  0.087
***  0.018  0.991  0.019 
2061  Cane Sugar  -0.752
***  0.121  -0.121
***  0.028  0.178
**  0.071  0.918  0.070 
2062  Cane Sugar Refining  -0.996
***  0.011  -0.026  0.040  0.041  0.056  1.013  0.063 
2063  Beet Sugar   -0.751
***  0.098  -0.191
***  0.040  0.215
***  0.064  0.879
*  0.074 
2064  Candy & Conf. Prods.  0.512  0.342  -0.465
***  0.077  0.272
***  0.043  1.071  0.052 
2066  Chocolate & Cocoa  -0.989
***  0.018  -0.052  0.012  0.058  0.036  1.294
***  0.046 
2074  Cottonseed Oil Mill  -0.255  0.287  -0.332
***  0.121  0.201  0.039  0.839
**  0.027 
2075  Soybean Oil Mill        0.993
***  0.013  -0.023  0.034  0.035  0.024  0.997  0.022 
2076  Vegetable Oil Mill           -0.636
***  0.125  -0.221
***  0.063  0.198
***  0.042  0.841
***  0.040 
2077  An./Mar. Fats & Oils  -0.002  0.315  -0.095
***  0.029  0.417
***  0.049  0.732
***  0.042 
2082  Malt Beverages           -0.682
***  0.116  -0.864
***  0.186  0.090
***  0.027  1.103
***  0.029 
2084  Wines & Brandy  -0.016  0.727  -0.433  0.317  0.204
***  0.088  0.971  0.025 
2087  Extracts & Syrups  -0.557
***  0.141  -0.349
***  0.105  0.286
***  0.030  1.529
***  0.058 
2095  Roasted Coffee  -0.853
***  0.098  -0.165
***  0.025  0.147  0.095  1.077  0.118 
2097  Manuf. Ice  6.515
***  2.255  -0.876
***  0.218  0.241
***  0.035  0.908
***  0.032 
2098  Macaroni & Spaghetti  0.272  0.367  -0.354
***  0.103  0.503
***  0.042  0.799
***  0.040 
2099  Food Preparations  2.453
***  0.921  -0.363
***  0.081  0.329
***  0.043  0.918
*  0.045 
 
Notes:  Levels of statistical significance are represented by *(10%), **(5%) and ***(1%).  The standard errors (s.e.) are indicated next 
to the estimated coefficients.  The null hypothesis for F  is -1 (perfect competition), while the null hypothesis for  cy e  is 1 (CRS). 
These results are based on the joint estimation of equations (5), (6) and (7). 
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Table 2:  Impacts of Industrial Concentration on Oligopoly Power, Cost and Output Price.    
 
  Impact of H on 
 
    Oligopoly    Cost    Output 
SIC  Industry  Power  s.e.  Efficiency  s.e.  Price  s.e. 
 
2011  Meat Packing  2.286
***  0.333  -2.244
***  0.564  0.042  0.257 
2013  Saus. & Prep. Meats  7.119
***  0.815  -0.175  1.294  1.944
***  0.630 
2015  Poultry & Egg Proc.  3.864
***  0.599  -0.759  0.715  3.105
***  0.354 
2022  Cheese  1.426
***  0.217  0.290  0.298  1.716
***  0.167 
2023  Dry Cond. & Evap. Milk  2.848
***  0.556  0.804  0.863  3.652
***  0.479 
2024  Ice Cream & Fr. Desserts  2.637
***  0.615  2.863
**  1.150  5.500
***  0.643 
2026  Fluid Milk  9.373
***  0.790  -6.867
***  1.531  2.506
***  0.835 
2032  Canned Specialties  0.530
***  0.111  1.317
***  0.193  1.847
***  0.103 
2033  Canned Fruit & Veg.  3.613
***  0.612  5.170
***  1.099  8.783
***  0.588 
2034  Dried Fruit & Veg.  1.136
***  0.301  3.958
***  0.554  5.094
***  0.299 
2035  Pickles, Sauces, etc.  2.459
***  0.353  -1.383
***  0.239  1.076
***  0.182 
2043  Cereal Breakfast Foods  0.531
***  0.095  1.621
***  0.159  2.152
**  0.084 
2044  Rice Milling  7.658  0.587  -2.680
**  1.201  -0.022  0.740 
2045  Prep. Flour & Doughs  0.550  0.362  3.957
***  0.773  4.507 
2046  Wet Corn Milling  0.423
**  0.170  0.448  0.292  0.871
***  0.164 
2048  Prep. Feeds  6.043
***  0.899  -0.809  1.706  5.234
***  0.864 
2052  Cookies & Crackers  0.946
*  0.540  -0.872
***  0.881  0.074
***  0.638 
2061  Cane Sugar  2.063
**  0.817  -1.721  1.453  0.342  0.771 
2062  Can Sugar Refining  0.184  0.254  0.107  0.521  0.291  0.273 
2064  Beet Sugar   1.311
***  0.419  -1.423
*  0.834  -0.112  0.413 
2064  Candy & Conf. Prods.  3.254
***  0.512  1.135  0.826  4.389
***  0.413 
2066  Chocolate & Cocoa  0.229  0.140  1.706
***  0.252  1.935
***  0.125 
2074  Cottonseed Oil Mill  2.246
***  0.375  -3.456
***  0.565  -1.210
***  0.303 
2075  Soybean Oil Mill        0.329  0.224  -0.062  -0.405  0.267  0.203 
2076  Vegetable Oil Mill           1.653
**  0.635  -2.548
***  0.635  -0.815
*  0.354 
2077  An./Mar. Fats & Oils  10.551
***  1.226  -12.099
***  1.909  -1.548
**  0.780 
2082  Malt Beverages           0.369
***  0.108  0.719
***  0.164  1.083
***  0.074 
2084  Wines & Brandy  2.276
***  0.239  -0.388  0.333  1.888
***  0.189 
2087  Fd. Extracts & Syrups  1.276
***  0.134  2.193
***  0.224  3.469
***  0.106 
2095  Roasted Coffee  0.901  0.583  0.788  1.200  1.689
**  0.677 
2097  Manuf. Ice  8.587
***  1.240  -5.136
***  1.731  3.451
***  1.185 
2098  Macaroni & Spaghetti  3.446
***  0.283  -1.862
***  0.370  1.584
***  0.164 
2099  Food Preparations  9.536
***  1.290  -3.415
*  1.843  6.121
***  1.102 
 
Notes:  Levels of statistical significance are represented by * (10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%). The standard errors (s.e.) are indicated 
next to the estimated coefficients.  These results are based on equation (8). Market Power and/or Efficiency     Lopez, Azzam, and Lirón-España 
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Appendix: Herfindahl Indexes 
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann index has only been 
published for 1982, 1987 and 1992. Additionally, the 
partial industrial concentration ratios (CR4, CR8, CR20, 
and CR50) have been published for (then Census years 
including) 1972 and 1977.  Given this paucity of data, H 
had to be estimated for each food industry for much of 
the sample period. This process involved two steps: (1) 
the estimation of the 1972 and 1977  H indexes from 
partial concentration ratios; (2) interpolation of the  H 
indexes for the inter-Census years. 
The first step involved the application of entropy to 
estimate the market shares of the top 50 firms. Using the 
technique presented by Golan, Judge, and Perloff (1996), 
the market shares were forecasted for all firms 
encompassed in CR4, CR8, CR20 and CR50. It turns out 
that the maximum entropy solution for the size 
distribution of firms yields equal market shares of firms 
within intervals of these concentration ratios.  After 
forecasting the market share of each firm in 1972 and 
1977, we restricted the estimated distribution of market 
shares to a third-degree polynomial function in order to 
estimate the most probable market share for each firm. 
The average R -square of the estimated polynomial 
functions was 95%. From the individual market share, 
we then estimated the H index as the sum of the squares 
of  market shares resulting from the polynomial 
distribution. 
  The second step involved regressing the Census-year 
H indexes on a set of instrumental variables that were 
available for the entire sample period (Chow and Lin, 
1971) such as total number of employees, sales, payroll, 
and value of shipments per employee for which a 
complete time-series data were available. These 
regressions yielded an average R -square of 85%. Then 
the H indexes were estimated with the predicted values 
from these regressions.  The forecasted values were quite 
smooth in relation to the H indexes for the Census years. 
The use of spline functions and exponential smoothing 
(using the CurveExpert software) did not significantly 
altered the results. Finally, it should be noted that food-
processing industries for which the 1982 Herfindahl 
indexes were not available (due to reclassification of the 
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